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Privation theorists think that there are no evil entities, that is, that there are no entities 
which are positively and intrinsically evil. But then what is it that the privation theorist is 
talking about when citing an evil? If there are no evil entities, then what does she 
quantify over in statements such as, "There are many evils which people suffer from"? 
Or, since, after all, a privation is a certain kind of lack, what kinds of properties are such 
that lacking them would result in an evil? The privation theorist must ontologically 
account for evils in some way. As a provisional statement, on the account I propose, 
privative evils are understood in terms of dispositional properties, or powers, which a 
being that suffers the evil lacks but ought to have: a privative evil is the absence of such 
dispositions or the prevention of such dispositions from properly manifesting.
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Privation theorists think that there are no evil entities, that is, that there are no entities 
which are positively and intrinsically evil. But then what is it that the privation theorist is 
talking about when citing an evil? If there are no evil entities, then what does she 
quantify over in statements such as, "There are many evils which people suffer from"? 
Or, since, after all, a privation is a certain kind of lack, what kinds of properties are such 
that lacking them would result in an evil? The privation theorist must ontologically 
account for evils in some way. In this paper I propose a sketch of such an ontological 
accounting for privative evils, focused on (and limited to) physical evils. As a 
provisional statement, on the account I propose, privative evils are understood in terms 
of dispositional properties, or powers, which a being1 that suffers the evil lacks but ought 
to have2: a privative evil is the absence of such dispositions or the prevention of such 
dispositions from properly manifesting.
First, in Part 1, in order to motivate bothering at all with a privative conception of evils, I 
briefly describe privation theory, clarifying what I take to be the questions it is intended 
 This thesis follows the style of Analysis.
1  When generically referring to things that suffer evils, I will use the term “being” instead of a more 
generic term, since biological beings of one sort or another are typically the subjects of such discourse.
2  “Ought to be had” arguably implies a form of essentialism; that is, “a ought to have P” means it is 
essential to a to ought to have P, even if a does not in fact have P. Indeed on privation theory, evils 
arise precisely because something is missing which ought to be there. However, this “ought to” 
relation, and the essentialism it implies, will be left unargued in this paper.
2to answer, as well as the questions that it isn’t, as this is helpful for reducing the number 
of what I think are common misconceptions about privation theory’s scope in the debate 
over the problem of evil. In Part 2 I sketch the dispositional view of privative evils (DE), 
first on a naive or generic conception of dispositions (leaving the devil in the details, as 
it were). Subsequently in Part 3, I consider (DE)’s prospects on two more specific 
accounts of dispositions: the causal basis view defended by David Lewis (1997), 
Elizabeth Prior, and others (Prior et al. 1982); and the powerful qualities view defended 
by C.B. Martin (1994, 1996), John Heil (2003, 2005), and Jonathan Jacobs (2011).
3CHAPTER II
PRIVATION THEORY
Why care about privation theory (PT)? Before briefly answering that question, let us first 
say what (PT) is. (PT) claims that any instance of evil is a privation, or lack, in a thing of 
some good where there ought to be that good. Put differently, (PT) claims that no entity 
is intrinsically evil; or alternatively again, that there is no real, or positively existing, 
intrinsic “evilness”. All entities are fully “good” insofar as they retain what they have by 
nature; it is only when they are corrupted by the loss, to some degree or another, of what 
they ought to have by nature that they can be said to be afflicted with evil. So, the upshot 
is, in Augustine’s words, “Nothing evil exists in itself” (Ch. 4) (although this is not to 
claim that evils in no meaningful sense exist).
So, why care about (PT)? I will offer three reasons one might accept (PT), though I will 
not defend them. If one is a theist3, one will be concerned to defend the claim that God is 
omnipotent. If God is omnipotent, then no entity (excepting God) could have come to 
exist but by God’s creative power. The theist will also be concerned to defend the claim 
that God is wholly good. But if God is wholly good, whence came evils? If evils are 
created, positive entities, then it seems God is directly causally responsible for creating 
evils, which is incompatible with God's being wholly good. Note that this is not a 
question of God’s justification for allowing evils; rather, it is a question of God’s nature: 
3  Let “theist” here mean one who believes in God, understood as an all-powerful, all-knowing, and 
perfectly good being.
4if something is positively evil—having an intrinsically evil nature—then God cannot be 
wholly good, for what is not in the source cannot be in the product. So one reason one 
might accept (PT) is to maintain that God is wholly good. Another reason is to maintain 
that God is omnipotent, or more specifically that God is the source of all that exists 
(other than himself). If God is wholly good and omnipotent, than there can be no 
positively evil entities. If what I have just said is true, then theists will find themselves, 
at least from these considerations, with a motive to accept (PT).
The third reason one might accept (PT) need not be motivated by theism. This reason is 
that on a privative view of evils, one’s ontology is simplified: not just because there will 
be one less class of entities in one’s ontological catalog, but also because making out 
what (positive, intrinsically) “evil” entities—or, as I prefer to call them, “bad bits”—
would be is a difficult exercise. Consider: what is the nature of a bad bit? I suspect that 
most attempts at an answer would be privative. Other attempts might appeal to personal 
or collective dislike. The latter seem problematic as general characterizations, even if 
certain exceptions (e.g. pain) are recalcitrant.
Now that the notion of privative evils is, I hope, clear4, two points ought to be made 
before moving on: one clarificatory, one concerning the scope of this paper. First, it has 
seemed to me that (PT) is sometimes dismissed on the grounds that it fails to accomplish 
a task which it isn’t supposed to accomplish, namely, solving the entire problem of evil 
4  G. Stanley Kane, though critical of privation theory, provides excellent clarifications of some common 
misconceptions about privation theory in part I of Kane 1980. Also, see Patrick Lee 2000. And, of 
course, see Augustine, Handbook on Faith, Hope, and Love, Ch. 4.
5as it is framed in contemporary discussions. I take (PT) to answer metaphysical 
questions which are conceptually prior to the contemporary debate over the problem of 
evil, those questions being about the nature of evil and the nature of God. (PT) may 
answer a metaphysical problem of evil, that is, the question of how evil-by-nature 
entities can exist, given a God who is by nature wholly good and omnipotent. But 
contemporary discussions center more around the question of whether God might be 
justified in permitting evil, questioning as an attribute of God either whole-goodness, on 
the grounds that a wholly good being would not desire to permit evils occurring; or 
omnipotence, on the grounds that an omnipotent God could prevent evils from 
occurring. But these are justificatory questions, not metaphysical questions; and the 
intended scope of (PT), as I understand it, applies only to the latter. But even if it is 
objected that answers to the justificatory questions are within the scope of (PT)'s claims, 
and that on that score (PT) fails, the baby need not be thrown out with the bathwater. 
(PT) may still be worth accepting for the reasons I mentioned above, even if (PT) fails to 
adequately refute contemporary arguments from evil.
I will limit the scope of this paper to discussion of a certain subset of evils. It has 
become customary to divide evils into two categories: natural evils (or sufferings) and 
moral evils. I will not here discuss moral evils. Natural evils may be further divided, 
roughly, into physical evils, and mental and emotional evils5. I will here only discuss 
physical evils.
5  E.g. Sadness, anxiety, perhaps pain, and so on. 
6CHAPTER III
EVILS AND DISPOSITIONS I
A generic view of dispositions
What is it that goes missing when a being is afflicted by evil?6 Properties of that being, it 
would seem. But what kinds of properties are these ontological victims of privative evils 
(henceforward, onto-victims)? Are they non-dispositional7 properties, such as being red, 
being six feet tall, having legs, and so on; or are they dispositional properties, or 
powers8, such as the power to see, to walk, to circulate blood through the veins? In what 
follows I propose that powers are the best candidates for playing the role of onto-
victims. That is, I propose that it is the loss of a power, and perhaps the masking or 
hindrance of the manifestation of a power, that is the principal source of trouble for a 
being afflicted by evil. This is because—and this is a central claim for the sketch of a 
dispositional view of privative evils (DE) I am proposing—I take it that a being’s powers 
are that which enable that being to realize a state of flourishing or well-being9. 
It is true that if certain non-dispositional properties of a being go missing, then some of 
6  Kane’s paper usefully dispels some misunderstandings about this, one being that any good not had by 
something is an evil (1980).
7  Following Martin, I will opt not to use the term “categorical,” in order to avoid implying that 
dispositional properties are non-actual by contrasting them against “categorical,” or fully actual, 
properties. I will instead use “non-dispositional” (1996: 74).
8  The terms disposition and power are often used interchangeably in the literature. I follow this practice, 
though I try to use one term or the other as is most useful or appropriate based on the context of the 
discussion. 
9 Indeed, one might take flourishing to be power-term: a being has the power to flourish when that all of 
that being’s powers are present and uninhibited.
7the being’s powers will not manifest properly. Because of this it might be thought that 
the absences of such non-dispositional properties are the principle source of trouble. 
However, non-dispositional properties are for powers, and not the other way round. 
Humans have eyes in order to see; legs in order to walk; and veins with a certain luminal 
width in order to circulate blood. It is also true that some powers may be thought of as 
contributing to the maintenance of other non-dispositional properties, that is, some 
powers are for non-dispositional properties. The power to see, for example, may 
safeguard many non-dispositional properties of a being, since sight helps the being to 
avoid harm. Suppose a tragic incident befalls Magoo, a blind man, resulting in the loss 
of his legs. (Perhaps he unknowingly stumbles onto train tracks.) Certainly if Magoo had 
sight, he would have been less likely to lose his legs. But why should Magoo care that he 
has lost his legs? Mainly because, as a result, Magoo can’t walk! So the loss of Magoo’s 
legs—and the loss of his property of having legs—has brought about the loss of Magoo’s 
power to walk. This is because, for humans, legs are for walking (among other powers). 
Thus Magoo’s loss of the power to see has also contributed to his loss of the power to 
walk; and his legs matter insofar as they facilitated his power to walk (among other 
powers). So, again, it seems that non-dispositional properties are for powers, not the 
other way round.
There are two ways evils can arise on (DE). One is by the loss of a power, and the other 
is by the hinderance of a power. (These two ways roughly correspond to the kinds of 
cases presented by C.B. Martin, Mark Johnston, and Andrew Bird, in their 
8finkish/altering and masking/antidote counterexamples to conditional analyses of 
dispositional ascriptions (Bird 1998; Johnston 1992; Martin 1994).) The following case 
illustrates both kinds of dispositional evils.
A mad warlock-optometrist renders both Isaac and Blake unconscious and transports 
them to his laboratory. Each is placed in a separate observation room. While Isaac and 
Blake are still unconscious, the warlock-optometrist magically removes Isaac’s eyes, 
ensuring that Isaac will feel no pain. In fact, Isaac will feel no different at all. The 
warlock-optometrist then blindfolds Blake’s eyes such that Blake will not detect the 
blindfold. Both Isaac’s and Blake’s hands are bound behind their respective backs. Soon 
after, Isaac and Blake awaken. Both are completely blinded and neither knows why. 
Later, both Isaac and Blake are again rendered unconscious, Isaac’s eyes are magically 
replaced, Blake is un-blindfolded, and both are unbound and returned to where they were 
kidnapped, where they awaken soon after. They walk home together, discussing their 
strange day, and their apparently similar experiences.
On (DE), both Isaac and Blake seem to suffer evils. This may seem counter-intuitive, 
since Isaac (temporarily) lost his eyes while Blake was only blindfolded. But at the time 
neither could see, and each, as far as he knew, was without functioning eyes. True, Isaac 
was deprived of what we may call a non-dispositional property, viz. his eyedness, while 
Blake had only the manifestation of his power to see masked (quite literally); but the 
effects were the same: neither could manifest the power of sight. 
9It might be objected that no real harm was done to Blake. But if “harm” means the loss 
of a property, then the response on (DE) is that the reason Isaac’s property-loss did him 
harm was that it removed his power to see, since eyes are for sight. It might also be 
objected that Blake’s plight was only temporary since the blindfold was removable. But 
suppose the story is modified slightly. The warlock-optometrist never undoes his deeds: 
Isaac and Blake are both blinded for the rest of their lives, each still assuming he is 
without functioning eyes. And Isaac’s blindness is no less reversible than Blake’s, for at 
any time the warlock-optometrist can replace Isaac’s eyes. Surely each case would be an 
instance of evil. In the present paper, however, space permits me only to make a start in 
the investigation of (DE), and so only evils as losses of powers will be discussed.
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CHAPTER IV
EVILS AND DISPOSITIONS II
Let us now turn from the generic view of dispositions considered above, to two more 
specific accounts of dispositions that have been recently defended, and let us see how 
(DE) fares on each of them. 
Causal bases
On the causal basis view (CB), defended by Lewis, Prior, et al., a disposition must have 
a causal basis; that is, the thing having the disposition must have a set of intrinsic 
properties which are, along with some attendant circumstances, causally sufficient to 
bring about the relevant manifestation. Generically, leaving out details about time, (CB) 
is represented by the following conditional analysis of dispositional ascriptions: 
(CB) Conditional analysis
x is disposed to manifest M under circumstances C iff when x has some 
set of intrinsic properties B and C obtains, x M’s because both x has B and 
C obtains.
So that analysis is, for (CB) defenders, how we ascribe, roughly, a disposition D to some 
object x. We say what x needs to be like and what has to happen to x. We ascribe the 
disposition fragility to a vase, for example, because the vase has, say, the property 
atomic-structure-irregularity, and because the vase breaks when rocks are thrown at it (or 
so we’ve always observed). 
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But what is a disposition? The above analysis helps us pick out an object that has a 
disposition, and tells us what happens when the object has that disposition. But it leaves 
unsaid10 what it is that we are analyzing. (DE)’s claim is that a being suffers an evil when 
one of its dispositions has been tampered with, so the “it” in “what it is” requires 
consideration. 
Lewis remains non-committal on what a disposition is, but mentions two of the options 
for (CB): first, there is Armstrong’s reductive solution (CBA) in which the disposition is 
identified with the state of affairs (hereafter, just “state”) of having the non-dispositional 
intrinsic properties that are the causal basis (Armstrong 1996). Second, there is Prior et 
al.’s (1982) solution (CBP) which keeps the dispositional property distinct from the set 
of properties which are its causal basis, and claims that the disposition is a higher-level 
property, had by the object ascribed with the disposition, but realized by the non-
dispositional properties that are its basis. 
Let us make a start at examining how (DE) fares on each of these versions of (CB). 
Recall the first of the two ways an evil can arise on (DE), viz., disposition loss. Here is a 
rough-and-ready analysis of disposition loss on (CB):
(CB) Disposition loss:
x loses disposition D iff x loses one or more b of B.
Joining (DE) with (CBA) would mean that the onto-victim is the state of having the 
intrinsic base. This seems problematic for (DE), since it is hard to see how states can be 
10  Indeed, Lewis, in his 1997: 151, intends to leave unsaid what a disposition is. 
12
the powers which ought to be had by a being. It seems wrong to think that token states 
are required for a being in the way that powers were thought to be. Perhaps one can say 
that a being ought to be, at any given time, in a state that at once qualifies as an 
occurrence of each type of state t in a set of state-types T, where these state-types are 
analogous to the having of the being’s various powers. Perhaps. But this option needs 
further investigation to dispel some of its attendant prima facie strangeness.
Joining (DE) with (CBP) has the advantage of providing a clear candidate for the role of 
onto-victim, namely, the higher-level dispositional property. This disposition, if lost, 
seems a clear case of evil, since the being ought to have its dispositions or powers. 
However, as Lewis and Heil point out, if dispositions are higher-level properties, then 
worries arise about dispositions being either systematically overdetermining or 
epiphenomenal. In general one wants to say that dispositions play a causal role in their 
manifestations. But if we do say this, then both the causal basis and its higher-level 
disposition seem to causally contribute to the manifestation in the same way and to the 
same degree, and thus the manifestation is causally overdetermined. On the other hand, 
if we say that it is the causal basis and not the higher-level disposition that makes this 
causal contribution, the disposition is epiphenomenal. This is particularly problematic on 
(DE), since a guiding premise of (DE) is that non-dispositional properties serve to 
facilitate dispositions or powers; and so it would be odd for (DE) if powers were 
impotent. Thus both alternatives for what dispositions are on (CBP) seem problematic 
for playing the role of onto-victims.
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Powerful qualities
C.B. Martin, John Heil, and Jonathan Jacobs have defended a view of dispositions that 
puts the causal power in properties themselves, as opposed to defenders of (CB), for 
whom properties are inert and causal power lies elsewhere. Jacobs has called the view 
wherein properties are both qualitative and dispositional, or powerful, the “powerful 
qualities” view (PQ) (2011). I prefer, for both terminological compactness (if at the 
expense of adding another term) and ease of distinguishing the understanding of 
properties between (CB) and (PQ), to call powerful qualities “powerties.” A powerty is a 
property both qualitative and powerful, but not a composite. Heil calls this the “identity 
view,” in which the qualitative and powerful in an intrinsic property are one and the 
same: they are the property (2005). Jacobs suggests that on the identity view, in order to 
avoid charges of compositeness, powerties be understood as a posteriori identities. 
Jacobs further suggests that, in order to support such an identity claim while maintaining 
that powerties are both qualitative and powerful, the powerful nature of powerties is to 
be understood in terms of truth-making, where powerties qua powers are (at least partial) 
truth-makers for the counterfactuals that describe power manifestations (2011). (I will 
pass over discussion of the qualitative nature of powerties.) Here is what I take to be an 
instance, using a stock example, of a power manifestation on Jacobs’s powerties/truth-
maker view:
(∀x)(∀y)(Fx ⋀ Hy ⋀ R(x, y)) ◻➝ (C((Fx ⋀ Hy ⋀ R(x, y)), Bx))
Suppose x is a vase; y is a rock; F is the property of being fragile (or, if you like, having 
14
an irregular atomic structure); H is the property of being hard; R is the relation of 
collision; B is the property of being broken; ◻➝ is the counterfactual conditional 
operator; and C is the causal relation. So, the vase’s being fragile, the rock’s being hard, 
and the two colliding, altogether form the antecedent of, or truth-maker for, the 
counterfactual claim that those things composing the antecedent would cause the vase to 
be broken. Further, this illustrates what on (PQ) has been called the reciprocal 
dispositionality of powerties, that is, that powers possessed by an object (e.g. the vase) 
bring about manifestations in partnership with other powerties (e.g. those in the rock), 
resulting in a causal handshake, as it were, between an object’s powerties and other 
powerties. (Although, obviously, the more powerties that are involved, the more 
complicated this interaction becomes). 
Again we must ask, what is a power on (PQ)? In one sense, the powerties are the 
powers.  But, short of whatever singular powers are possessed by whatever particles the 
physicists tell us are the elementary ones, it seems that powers must be complexes of 
powerties. Indeed, it is these powerty complexes that, I take it, are the powers on (PQ). 
More specifically, the Φ in “x’s power to Φ in circumstance-set C” is the truth-making 
powerty complex that x contributes to the antecedent of the counterfactual expressing the 
manifestation of a power. So, in the above example of the vase, the power to be fragile, 
or to break, just is F, or x’s property of fragility, since that is all x contributes to the 
antecedent. Obviously, this is very simplified. Consider another, slightly more 
complicated example, one perhaps more germane to (DE): 
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(∀x)(∀y)((P1x ⋀ P2x ⋀ … ⋀ Pnx) ⋀ Wy ⋀ R(x, y)) ◻➝
(C((P1x ⋀ P2x ⋀ … ⋀ Pnx) ⋀ Wy ⋀ R(x, y)), Sx))
Suppose x is Bob, a human; y is a photon; in (P1, P2, …, Pn), P1 is the property of 
eyedness, while the other Pi are other properties relevant to human vision; W is a 
particular wavelength in the range visible to humans; R is the relation of entering; and S 
is the property of seeing something. In this example, Bob’s power to see is construed as 
his property complex (P1, P2, …, Pn), which is Bob’s truth-making contribution to the 
antecedent of the manifestation of his power to see. This makes sense, since if it is Bob’s 
power, it cannot include extrinsic powerties, though the instantiation of extrinsic 
powerties are required for his power of sight to do its work. 
So far, then, a power on (PQ) seems to be the object’s truth-making contribution to a 
counterfactual’s antecedent, in the form of some intrinsic powerty complex. This is a 
virtue of (PQ) with respect to masking/antidote objections generally, since the (PQ) 
defender may say that a certain power did what it was supposed to do, since the power’s 
partnering with unexpected powerties would be expected to reciprocally manifest some 
unexpected manifestation. For similar reasons, powers as powerty complexes may also 
be helpful for (DE) in understanding evils that arise by masking, although that is beyond 
the scope of the present paper. 
However, powers as powerty complexes also seem problematic for (DE), since, although 
the causal power has clearly been relocated into the natures of the disposition properties 
16
(i.e. the powerties) which are had by beings, it is still unclear how powerty complexes 
can be powers suitable for the role of onto-victims. Recall the first of the two ways an 
evil can arise on (DE)--disposition loss—and consider the following (PQ)-adjusted 
analysis: 
(PQ) Disposition loss:
x loses disposition D iff x loses one or more p of P, where P is an intrinsic 
powerty-complex of x, and P is x’s complete truth-making contribution to 
the antecedent of the counterfactual expressing a manifestation of D.
So (DE) needs a D, a power, as an onto-victim, as the thing which when lost brings 
about an evil (i.e. for disposition-loss evils). But what makes a powerty complex a 
power? More specifically, what individuates the complex, and what unifies it? With 
respect to the individuation question, consider: suppose x’s power P = powerty complex 
PC1 = (P1, P2, P3) which is causally sufficient, on x’s part, to bring about some 
manifestation M. But suppose adding P4 to the complex still results in M. Why isn’t P = 
PC2 = (P1, P2, P3, P4)? Any answer would seem to appeal to manifestations (i.e. that P4 
isn’t required for the desired manifestation). But perhaps this works: if, in all worlds 
which agree with respect to the powers endowed to all powerties, any things having 
either powerty complex (P1, P2, P3) or (P1, P2, P3, P4) bring about M, then perhaps P4 
does not belong in P. 
With respect to the unification question, the only answers that come to mind are that 
either (i) the manifestations or (ii) the power concept unifies the powerties in the 
complex. (i) seems problematic for the same reasons non-(PQ) views struggle with 
dispositional ascriptions by conditional analysis, namely, that circumstances can be 
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thought of wherein the desired manifestation does not occur, making false those 
analyses. Adding ceteris paribus clauses wherein the circumstances (i.e. the truth-
making contributions by entities other than the being said to possess the power) specified 
are such that M1 arises and not M2, seem to fall prey to triviality objections (Martin 1994: 
5). Jacobs admits (PQ) could be vulnerable to such a triviality objection if (PQ) was 
intended as an analysis of power concepts; but, he says, (PQ) isn’t so intended (2011: 
18). This then makes (ii) irrelevant.
This all leaves (DE) in a difficult spot, since it now seems that power concepts are what 
(DE) needs as onto-victims, not simply powerties. (One might suggest that it is enough 
to say that Bob, say, ought to have properties P1, P2, and P3, since those true-make the 
desired counterfactuals; and so the loss of one of those properties is a suitable onto-
victim. However, one might ask why it matters that one of those properties has gone 
missing? The response is likely to make reference to a power, which brings us back to 
powers, or power concepts, as the principal onto-victims.)
One might try taking powers as higher-level properties of powerty complexes, similar to 
(CBP). However, (PQ) defenders will reject this for various reasons, some of which were 
mentioned in the discussion of (CBP) above. Additionally, Heil thinks that the primary 
motive for the desire to make dispositions into higher-level properties is the belief that 
dispositions are “multiply realizable,” that is, that a disposition can be a higher-level 
property of differing sets of lower-level properties. But Heil says this is based on a 
18
confusion: drinking glasses and clay pots are both “fragile,” but they break differently. 
Dispositional predicates like “is fragile” are convenient simplifications, but to allow 
using them to commit us to higher-level entities lets the “linguistic tale (sic) wag the 
ontological dog” (2005: 347). Rather, Heil suggests, we should understand such 
predicates to be satisfied by various powerty complexes, so long as we take these 
predicates to be somewhat loose or flexible, since different powerty complexes will not 
cause precisely the same manifestations (2003: 89).
Heil’s point is a good one, but I am not convinced it need be accepted wholesale. To see 
why his point may be doubted, consider another (again, somewhat fantastic) case: Bob is 
walking to the philosophy department, his power to walk manifesting admirably. But 
trouble befalls Bob: he falls into an open pit left by construction crews, and his legs are 
damaged so severely that they are amputated later at the hospital. Clearly, Bob has 
suffered an evil. He has lost his legs, and thus has lost his power to walk. But, thankfully, 
medical technology has become greatly advanced and techno-surgeons equip Bob with a 
pair of robo-legs so advanced that all of Bob's leg-relevant powers are restored fully. 
Now, is Bob, post-accident, suffering an evil? He still has no (human) legs, but his 
power to walk is restored completely. So it seems like he does have the power to walk, 
but brought about by different different powerties (i.e. the ones composing his robo-
legs). It might be replied that he does have the property of leggedness, regardless of the 
composition of his legs, so his restored power to walk is not a problem. But according to 
Heil, different powerty complexes PC1 and PC2 cannot both give rise to power W 
19
(passing over the question of universals or tropes). I assume that Heil’s argument against 
higher-level properties which are said to be powers (e.g. being fragile, able to walk) 
would apply similarly to higher-level properties not normally thought of as powers (e.g. 
leggedness). So, if Bob’s old human leg was composed of powerties, say, P1, P2, …, Pn, 
where P1 is having a bone, P2 is having a muscle, and so on; and if his new robo-leg is 
composed of powerties Pn+1, Pn+2, …, Pn+o, where Pn+1 is having a titanium exoskeletal 
shin, Pn+2 is having a motor, and so on; then it seems that Bob’s pre-accident leggedness 
is not, for Heil, the same as Bob’s post-accident leggedness, since leggedness seems to 
be a higher-level property. And given that the qualitative and powerful in a powerty are 
identical on (PQ), it seems one can’t say that supposed power concepts are disallowed as 
higher-level properties, while other higher-level properties are allowed (or at least it 
would need to be argued). Thus it still seems that Bob, both as a legged man before and a 
robo-legged man afterward, has the power to walk, and is not suffering that evil any 
longer.11 But if so, then (DE) seems to require that there exist, in some sense, a power to 
walk. If the power to walk is, as Heil and Jacobs suggest (and object to), a power 
concept, then (DE) seems to press one to accept power concepts as real entities.
11  More can be said here. To only gesture at such a course, one may press the objections against post-
accident Bob having W (the power to walk); maybe one can accept power concepts, but say that pre-
accident, Bob had W1, while post-accident, he has W2, as indiscernible as the powers may appear; and 
one may further accept that Bob is no longer suffering an evil. But then one may be pressed into 




Theists who find themselves pressed to accept privation theory (on grounds mentioned 
but not argued in this paper) have reason to think that dispositions, or powers, are the 
principal entities that, if missing, bring about a physical evils. To support this view, I 
have sketched a dispositional privation theory of evil (DE) which requires that there be 
entities, powers, which are suitable for the role I have dubbed as ontological victim of 
evil (or onto-victim). However, when joining (DE) with both causal basis and powerful 
qualities views of dispositions or powers, problems arise. This is chiefly because it is 
difficult to see what any (DE)-suitable power can be on these views, above the level of 
elementary particles. Such higher-level powers, or power concepts, are looked on with 
suspicion with respect to the ontological commitments they may incur (even though 
these are the power concepts deployed in most discussion of dispositions or powers). But 
(DE) seems to require such powers as real entities. Thus it is worthwhile that more work 
be done to explore the merits of both (DE) and real powers or power concepts. 
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